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Abstract: 
 
There is substantial controversy over the extent to which social science should be used in 
jury selection. Underlying the debate are two competing interests in the make-up of a 
jury: a privilege to strike prospective jurors on subjective grounds, which supports 
scientific jury selection, and an collective interest of citizens to be free from exclusion 
from jury service, which does not. While the incommensurability of the interests 
precludes resolution of the controversy in the abstract, specific solutions are possible. 
Using the example of selection of jurors based upon their respective levels of 
extraversion, we describe how the competing interests frequently do not apply to concrete 
cases. In the subsequent analysis, we show that, rhetoric notwithstanding, a normative 
preference for adhering to tradition and institutional inertia are the primary instrumental 
considerations for determining whether peremptory challenges based upon personality 
traits like extraversion ought to be allowed. Consistent with this analysis, we conclude 
that the practice of striking jurors based upon estimates of such personality traits is 
appropriate.   
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Introduction 
While attending a Continuing Legal Education seminar, the first author overheard 
an exchange in which one lawyer (no doubt primed by the particularities of the author's 
facial hair) advised another: “Always challenge jurors with goatees; they are too smart 
for their own good.” As the focus of voir dire is not on what is good for jurors, perhaps 
more accurate advisements would have been either “too smart for your client’s good” or 
“perceptive enough to recognize and react negatively to a weak evidence or argument.” 
Likely dating back to the inception of the jury system, trial lawyers have cataloged 
physical and behavioral cues in litigation folklore as markers for particular personality 
traits, attitudes, or other psychological characteristics thought to be undesirable in jurors.1 
Since the 1970s, those with the resources to do so have hired jury consultants to employ 
empirical methods to find out which of these hunches are correct and to suggest new 
possibilities.2   
“Scientific jury selection”3 is cited as both the source of and solution to many 
potential ethical issues in jury selection.4 As such, it is the subject of a substantial 
1 For discussions of some examples and their veracity, see generally Franklin Strier & Donna Shestowsky, 
Profiling the Profilers: A Study of the Trial Consulting Profession, Its Impact on Trial Justice and What, If 
Anything, to Do About It, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 441 (1999); Solomon M. Fulero & Stephen D. Penrod, The 
Myths and Realities of Attorney Jury Selection Folklore And Scientific Jury Selection: What Works?, 17 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 229 (1990); Shari Seidman Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social Scientists 
Know and Do Not Know, 73 JUDICATURE 178 (1989); and Jim Goodwin, Note, Articulating the 
Inarticulable: Relying On Nonverbal Behavioral Cues To Deception To Strike Jurors During Voir Dire, 38 
ARIZ. L. REV. 739 (1996).  
2 A famous example is that of the O.J. Simpson Trial. In the case, both prosecution and defense teams hired 
jury consultants to study which jurors would be most receptive to their respective arguments; see Michiko 
Kakutani, Figuring Out the O.J. Simpson Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1996, at C14. The prosecution, 
however, elected to ignore its experts when they advised that their research indicated that, domestic 
violence notwithstanding, African-American women would be sympathetic to the defense. Although it is 
impossible to say with certainty how much this affected the final outcome, it is true that the final twelve-
person jury that acquitted Mr. Simpson consisted of seven African-American women. Id. 
3 This phrase refers to the selection of juries based on physical and behavioral characteristics. See, e.g., 
Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 1; Fulero & Penrod, supra note 1. 
4 See Strier & Shestowsky, supra note 1, at 471. 
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debate.5  Underlying and perpetuating the controversy over the use of psychological 
science in jury selection is a fundamental contradiction between two competing interests 
in jury composition: the recently recognized right of citizens not to be excluded from jury 
service and litigants’ ancient common law privilege to remove a prospective juror 
without any stated justification.   
According to the Supreme Court, jury service represents a fundamentally 
important experience for citizens in a democracy:   
Jury service preserves the democratic element of the law, as it guards the 
rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all of 
the people. It affords ordinary citizens a valuable opportunity to 
participate in a process of government, an experience fostering, one hopes, 
a respect for law. Indeed, with the exception of voting, for most citizens 
the honor and privilege of jury duty is their most significant opportunity to 
participate in the democratic process.6 
 
Indeed, in Powers v. Ohio, the Court recognized a right of jurors not to be excluded from 
service based on their race in no small part because a jury system open to all citizens 
prevents abuse, promotes equality, is instrumental in civic education, and instills 
individuals with a sense of duty.7   
5 See generally, III. Jury Selection and Composition, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1443 (1997); Collin P. Wedel, 
Note, Twelve Angry (and Stereotyped) Jurors: How Courts Can Use Scientific Jury Selection to End 
Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 293 (2011); Rachel Hartje, Comment, A 
Jury Of Your Peers?: How Jury Consulting May Actually Help Trial Lawyers Resolve Constitutional 
Limitations Imposed on the Selection Of Juries, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 479 (2005); Stephanie Leonard 
Yarbrough, The Jury Consultant—Friend or Foe of Justice, 54 SMU L. REV. 1885  (2001); Maureen E. 
Lane, Note, Twelve Carefully Selected Not So Angry Men: Are Jury Consultants Destroying The American 
Legal System?, 32 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 463 (1999); Debra Sahler, Comment, Scientifically Selecting Jurors 
While Maintaining Professional Responsibility: A Proposed Model Rule, 6 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 383 
(1996); Dennis P. Stolle et. al., The Perceived Fairness of the Psychologist Trial Consultant: An Empirical 
Investigation, 20 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 139 (1996); Jeremy W. Barber, Note, The Jury Is Still Out: The 
Role of Jury Science in the Modern American Courtroom, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1225 (1994); Raymond J. 
Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 369 (1992); J. 
Alexander Tanford & Sarah Tanford, Better Trials Through Science: A Defense of Psychologist-Lawyer 
Collaboration, 66 N.C. L. REV. 741 (1988). 
6 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 407 (1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
7 Id. at 406-07. 
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 Given the breadth of rhetoric supporting the public-policy rationale for a legal 
interest in jury service, one might expect that courts diligently protect prospective jurors 
from exclusion. If so, one would be sorely disappointed. It is legally permissible for trial 
lawyers to act on the vast majority of their stereotypic associations, however arbitrary, 
between many aspects of physical appearance, observable behaviors, psychological traits, 
and jury verdicts when using challenges to excuse prospective jurors from the jury pool.8 
In fact, the actual limitations on the use of peremptory challenges are extremely narrow.9   
Since 1965, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that jurors cannot be challenged 
based upon their race,10 gender,11 ethnicity,12 and, at least in theory, other stereotyped 
groups that were the targets of historical prejudice,13 including religious affiliation.14 
Commentators argue that this classification should be extended to members of a range of 
social categories, including those defined by sexual orientation,15 obesity,16 disability,17 
and criminal record.18 However, there is no systematically-recognized right for members 
of these groups to protect them from a peremptory challenge. Moreover, there appear to 
be few if any serious arguments on behalf of those whose behaviors identify them—
8 See Goodwin, supra note 1. 
9 See id. 
10 See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
11 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
12 See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352 (1991); see also Elaine A. Carlson, Batson, J.E.B., and 
Beyond: The Paradoxical Quest for Reasoned Peremptory Strikes in the Jury Selection Process, 46 
BAYLOR L. REV. 947, 1005 (1994). 
13 See Carlson, supra note 12, at 962-63 (citing Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992)). 
14 See, e.g., A.C. Johnstone, Peremptory Pragmatism: Religion and the Administration of the Batson Rule, 
1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 441 (1998). 
15 See, e.g., V.H. Eisemann, Striking a Balance of Fairness: Sexual Orientation and Voir Dire, 13 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2001). 
16 See, e.g., M.E. O’Grady, A Jury of Your Skinny Peers: Weight-Based Peremptory Challenges and the 
Culture of Fat Bias, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 47 (2011). 
17 Mary A. Lynch, The Application Of Equal Protection To Prospective Jurors with Disabilities: Will 
Batson Cover Disability-Based Strikes?, 57 ALB. L. REV. 289 (1993). 
18 Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65 (2003); James M. 
Binnall, Sixteen Million Angry Men: Reviving a Dead Doctrine to Challenge the Constitutionality of 
Excluding Felons from Jury Service, 17 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1 (2009). 
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accurately or inaccurately—as members of more loosely-defined social groups, such as 
the facial-haired intelligentsia.  
What explains the inconsistency between the Supreme Court’s expansive rhetoric 
concerning the benefits of jury service and the limited scope of protections for such 
service in practice? While the former may justify restrictions on the ability to exclude 
prospective jurors based upon assessments of their psychological traits, the latter permits 
such exclusions. Rejecting an abstracted approach to this question, we analyze a specific, 
novel example of the issues created by the recognition of competing interests in jury 
service.   
In Part I, which focuses on criminal defendants, we provide an overview of the 
history and policy rationale supporting peremptory challenges and the Constitutional 
limitations imposed on them. In Part II, we present an empirical case for why criminal 
defendants may wish to strike jurors due to estimates of their respective levels of the 
personality trait extraversion. We report an original set of studies indicating that the trait 
extraversion can affect receptivity to expert testimony in the context of a capital case, 
biasing jurors’ perceptions of the appropriate verdict. Further, we review psychological 
literature showing that lawyers could, as a practical matter, reliably identify jurors’ levels 
of extraversion from their observed behavior.   
In Part III, we expose the limitations of the public-policy rationale articulated by 
the courts regarding jury service generally, as well as its application to determine the 
propriety of peremptory challenges based on jurors’ psychological characteristics. We 
then suggest two alternative policy criteria and discuss the implications and shortcomings 
of each. Finally, based on the analysis, we argue that judicial decisions regarding the 
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appropriate scope of the peremptory challenge are best understood through the criteria of 
legal traditionalism and institutional inertia, rather than any expressed rhetoric about the 
value of jury service. Given these criteria, except in the narrow case of historically 
disadvantaged “discrete and insular minorities,”19 the privilege of a party to strike 
prospective jurors based upon estimates of their psychological characteristics — such as 
personality — trumps the interests of a particular citizen in jury service.20   
I. Exclusion and Inclusion: A History of Interests in Jury Service   
Courts and scholars have recognized numerous distinct bases for interests related 
to the use of peremptory challenges.21 For simplicity, these bases can be placed into two 
categories. The first is the privilege of the litigants, particularly criminal defendants, to 
strike jurors whom they perceive to be partial. The second is the collective interest of 
citizens in jury service. This section provides an overview of each.   
A.   A Common Law Privilege to Exclude  
The privilege of a criminal defendant to make peremptory challenges is ancient, 
with roots in Roman practice, and is related to the common law right to an unbiased 
jury.22 At the inception of the institution of the jury trial, juries more resembled a 
collection of witnesses, each of whom was expected to have some firsthand knowledge of 
the facts of the case, rather than the abstracted deliberative body with which we are 
19 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
20 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
21 See generally Audrey M. Fried, Fulfilling the Promise of Batson: Protecting Jurors from the Use of 
Race-Based Peremptory Challenges by Defense Counsel, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311 (1997); Richard M. Re, 
Re-Justifying the Fair Cross Section Requirement: Equal Representation and Enfranchisement in the 
American Criminal Jury, 116 YALE L.J. 1568 (2007); Barbara D. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination 
in Jury Selection: Whose Right Is It, Anyway? 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725 (1992); III. Jury Selection and 
Composition, supra note 5; Kalt, supra note 18. 
22 A comprehensive discussion of the history of the jury is beyond the scope of this article and is covered 
extensively elsewhere. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of Criminal Jury 
in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867 (1994); see also JOHN PETTINGAL, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE USE 
AND PRACTICE OF JURIES AMONG THE GREEKS AND ROMANS 135 (1769). 
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familiar today.23  Even then, however, jurors were to be independent of the parties to the 
case, e.g., not relatives or associates.24 To enforce the right to an unbiased jury, counsel 
were ultimately able to challenge either the entire venire, as having been delivered by a 
biased official, or jurors individually on one of four grounds: that the juror was royalty, 
had been convicted of a crime that indicated he was not credible, was deficient in terms 
of legal status (e.g., a slave, a woman, not a citizen, or not a landholder), or was 
suspected of bias either with or without proof.25   
The latter challenge, as embodied in 18th century English common law, was 
imported to colonial America as the peremptory challenge.26 Here, as in England, it was 
considered an essential procedural mechanism, but not necessarily one designed to make 
juries unbiased. Rather, the purpose of the peremptory challenge was to help ensure the 
legal system did not seem to be biased, as “to perform its high function in the best way 
‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’”27 For this reason, the peremptory 
challenge was considered so fundamental that its “denial or impairment . . . [was] 
reversible error without a showing of prejudice.”28  
For example, in an early U.S. Supreme Court opinion deciding criminal 
defendants charged with the same capital offense lacked a right to be tried separately, 
Justice Story reviewed the common law rationale for the peremptory challenge.29 Citing 
23 J.H. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 86-89 (3d ed. 1990). 
24 Id. 
25 Carlson, supra note 12, at 988-90 (1994) (citing 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, *349, *350). 
26 Id. at 951-53. 
27 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)), 
overruled by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Social scientific research supports the notion that 
litigants who perceive the justice system as procedurally fair are more willing to support it, even when they 
lose a case. See, e.g., E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
64 (1988). 
28 See Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (citing Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 376 (1982)). 
29 United States v. Marchant & Colson, 25 U.S. 480, 482 (1827). 
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Blackstone, he observed that the ability to make challenges to jurors was one of 
exclusion, not selection.30 It existed—within the limits of the total number of challenges 
allowed, the computation of which became an issue when two or more defendants were 
tried together—to give defendants a way to avoid being tried by a jury composed of 
individuals they perceived to be biased against them.31 The subjectivity of the 
defendants’ perception of who might be biased was not considered a weakness of the 
procedure, but essential to it: 
As every one must be sensible what sudden impressions and 
unaccountable prejudices we are apt to conceive upon the bare looks and 
gestures of another, and how necessary it is that a prisoner (when put to 
defend his life) should have a good opinion of his jury, the want of which 
might totally disconcert him, the law wills not that he should be tried by 
any one man against whom he has conceived a prejudice, even without 
being able to assign a reason for such his dislike.32 
  
Thus the core historical justification for the right to a peremptory challenge had less to do 
with actual bias (i.e., that which was grounded in fact or could in theory be proven) as 
with addressing a defendant’s concern, however unfounded, that the deck was effectively 
stacked against him.    
 B. Limits on the Peremptory Challenge33 
 The common law articulated by Blackstone is not the only source of peremptory 
challenge jurisprudence. Indeed, in 1790 the same Congress that proposed the Bill of 
Rights passed an act recognizing the use of the procedure in capital cases.34 It was not 
until the 20th century, however, that U.S. Supreme Court began to explore in earnest 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Lewis, 146 U.S. at 376 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *353). A similar, albeit less 
central, justification was offered for peremptory challenges for prosecutors, as well as the purpose of 
offsetting any advantage in this regard to the defendant as “the scales [of justice] are to be evenly held.” 
Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70 (1887)). 
33 See, e.g., III. Jury Selection and Composition, supra note 5; Underwood, supra note 21. 
34 See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 481 (1990). 
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Constitutional justifications for rights and duties related to the peremptory challenge. 
However, the exploration was not directed towards bolstering or guaranteeing the 
peremptory challenge, but rather the opposite. In 1919, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly 
rejected the argument that the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury guarantees 
peremptory challenges.35 Instead, the Court ultimately used the Constitution as the source 
of the first recognized limits on the peremptory challenge as a privilege to exclude 
potential jurors for arbitrary or capricious reasons. 
 Consistent with the peremptory challenge’s roots as a way to avoid the perception 
of a biased jury, the first substantive limits on the use of peremptory challenges related to 
systematic use of the procedure by prosecutors to ensure all-white juries. In Swain, the 
Supreme Court recognized that such use to carry out a discriminatory policy could violate 
equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.36 In the case, an African-American 
defendant appealed a rape verdict in part on the grounds that Alabama prosecutors had 
used their peremptory challenges to strike African-American jurors not only in his case, 
but in every case, with the result that there had never been an African-American juror 
empanelled in the county where the trial was held.37 
 After reviewing the history of the peremptory challenge, the Court first opined 
that the challenge’s fundamental property was the ability of parties to strike jurors for any 
reason without judicial oversight.38 Acceptable justifications for strikes included: the 
party’s “sudden impressions and unaccountable prejudices” thoughts as to “whether [a 
juror] from a different group is less likely to be” partial, “a juror’s ‘habits and 
35 Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919); see also Holland, 493 U.S. 474. 
36 Cf. Swain, 380 U.S. at 204. 
37 Id. at 223. 
38 Id. at 213-14. 
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associations’” or his or her “race, religion, nationality, occupation or affiliations.”39 The 
Court then drew a distinction between intra- and inter-case considerations.40 In particular, 
the Court held that the exercise of a peremptory challenge for any reason specific to a 
particular defendant, crime, or case was entirely privileged.41 However, a pattern of race-
targeted peremptory challenges by the “prosecutor in a county, in case after case, 
whatever the circumstances, whatever the crime and whoever the defendant or the victim 
may be” raised an issue of equal protection.42 Thus, for the first time defendants had not 
only a privilege to strike jurors arbitrarily, but also a potential right to a trial before a jury 
composed of at least a limited class of individuals who the prosecutor would have 
stricken with complete discretion. 
 As a practical matter, however, the right existed for defendants only in theory. 
The burden necessary to invoke judicial inquiry into the basis for a prosecutor’s 
peremptory challenge was heavy, requiring the production of evidence of the prosecutor’s 
systematic use of the challenges across other cases. In Batson v. Kentucky, the Supreme 
Court removed the intra-/inter-case distinction,43 effectively lowering the burden by 
allowing defendants to make out a prima facie case of racial discrimination using 
evidence from only the peremptory challenges in the case at issue.44 Although historically 
unprecedented, the recognition of a constitutional limitation on prosecutors’ peremptory-
39 Id. at 220-21 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
40 Id. at 222-23. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 223 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
43 The distinction survives in some tests for what bases of peremptory challenges are permissible. See, e.g., 
People v. Tapia, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 851, 866 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (peremptory challenges may not be used to 
remove prospective jurors solely on the basis of presumed group bias). We defined group bias as a 
presumption that certain jurors are biased merely because they are members of an identifiable group 
distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar grounds. Peremptory challenges are permissible only if 
they are based on specific bias, defined as “a bias relating to the particular case on trial or the parties or 
witnesses thereto.” Id. (quoting People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 761 (Cal. 1978)). 
44 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 80 (1986). 
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challenge privilege was far less significant than the next development in the evolving 
dialogue between peremptory challenges and the U.S. Constitution. 
 In Powers v. Ohio, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized a new, competing interest 
related to the use of peremptory challenges: the right of citizens selected for jury service 
not to be excluded based upon their race.45 In Powers, the defendant, a Caucasian man, 
objected to the prosecutor’s use of seven of ten peremptory challenges to remove 
African-American jurors from the venire.46 After his conviction for murder, the defendant 
appealed the verdict under Batson, citing his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal 
protection.47 The Court reversed and remanded on the grounds that the prosecutor’s use 
of race-based peremptory challenges violated the rights of individual jurors “not to be 
excluded from [a petit jury] on account of race.”48   
 As a foundation for the new right, the Court reviewed dissents in judicial 
opinions, as well as political scholarship going back to Alexis de Tocqueville asserting 
the importance of an inclusionary jury system.49 On this basis, it opined jury service was 
central to citizenship, provided a civic education and an opportunity to participate in the 
administration of justice, and supplied the “democratic element of the law,” which 
“guards the rights of the parties and ensures continued acceptance of the laws by all of 
45 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991). 
46 Id. at 400. 
47 Id. at 403. The defendant also raised a Sixth Amendment claim, but, while the case was pending, the 
Supreme Court “held the Sixth Amendment did not restrict the exclusion of a racial group at the 
peremptory challenge stage.” Id. at 404 (citing Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 488 (1990) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring)).  
48 Powers, 499 U.S. at 400. 
49 See id. at 406-10. 
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the people.”50 Powers, in turn, opened the door for allowing prosecutors to object to, and 
to force judicial inquiry into, the basis for defendants’ peremptory challenges.51   
 Thus, coming full circle, the Supreme Court justified the most substantive 
limitation on a defendant’s privilege to peremptorily challenge jurors on very similar 
public policy grounds as the peremptory challenge itself. Parties to a criminal case have 
traditionally been given the unfettered privilege to remove prospective jurors thought to 
be biased as a safeguard against the accusation that the jury trial itself was a sham and the 
scales already firmly tilted in favor of a particular verdict. The right of prospective jurors 
not to be excluded from service serves the same goal: avoiding “the inevitable loss of 
confidence in our judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom 
engenders.”52     
II. The Example of Extraverted Jurors  
Should psychological science be used to identify and systematically exclude 
jurors with particular identifiable psychological and/or interpersonal characteristics? 
Where does the ability to exclude end and right to be free from exclusion begin? Given 
courts have derived two mutually-exclusive interests related to jury composition from the 
same public-policy goal, answering these questions definitively in the abstract is likely 
impossible. We argue that one need not do so. Rather, the tension between the common 
law peremptory challenge and Constitutional freedom from exclusion is best resolved 
with reference to specifics: specific practices, specific traits, and specific interests.   
50 See Powers, 499 U.S. at 407 (1991) (citing Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 215 (1958)) (Black, J., 
dissenting)).  
51 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); see also Carlson, supra note 12, at 962. 
52 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 140 (1994). 
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To set the stage for such an analysis, in this section, we present original research 
suggesting that a juror’s level of extraversion could bias the extent to which they are 
persuaded by expert testimony, ultimately affecting whether the juror supports a sentence 
of guilty versus one of not guilty in a capital case. In addition, we review psychological 
research indicating that juror extraversion is a trait that is readily and reliably observable 
and, thus, as a practical matter, is one that could be used to analyze a venire and 
determine which jurors to strike.   
A. Effects of Juror Extraversion on the Impact of Expert Testimony 
Use of expert testimony is a common, often central, and sometimes required 
feature of litigation.53 Jurors' perceptions of the credibility of an expert witness are 
critical to the effectiveness of the witness.54 Itself a source of information, credibility can 
act as evidence for an argument, affect the amount of thought exerted by jurors, and bias 
their ongoing perceptions and thought processes in favor of or against a desired 
outcome.55 In fact, a witness’s status as an expert may provide a simple cue to the jurors 
that they can be less critical of the arguments presented due to the heuristic assumption 
that experts are usually correct.56 
53 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 82-83 (1985) (recognizing criminal defendants’ right to expert 
testimony when their psychological condition is at issue); Briggs v. Wash. Metro. Transit Auth., 481 F.3d 
839, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (collecting a variety of cases in which expert testimony was required by the D.C. 
Circuit); Urdang v. Mahrer, 158 N.E.2d 902 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959) (“The overwhelming weight of authority 
supports the view that ordinarily expert evidence is essential to support an action for malpractice against a 
physician or surgeon.”).  But see Colin Miller, No Expertise Required: How Washington D.C. Has Erred in 
Expanding Its Expert Testimony Requirement, 39 RUTGERS L. REC. 55 (2012) (arguing that expert 
testimony should not be required in many types of cases). 
54 See Stanley L. Brodsky et al., The Witness Credibility Scale: An Outcome Measure for Expert Witness 
Research, 28 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 892 (2010) [hereinafter Brodsky et al., The Witness Credibility Scale]. 
55 See Richard E. Petty & Pablo Brinol, Persuasion: From Single to Multiple Metacognitive Processes, 3 
PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 137 (2008); Richard E. Petty et al., Source and Message Factors in Persuasion: A 
Reply to Stiff’s Critique of the Elaboration Likelihood Model, 54 COMM. MONOGRAPHS 233 (1987). 
56 See, e.g., Shelly Chaiken, Heuristic Versus Systematic Information Processing and the Use of Source 
Versus Message Cues in Persuasion, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 752 (1980); Richard E. Petty, 
John T. Cacioppo & Rachel Goldman, Personal Involvement as a Determinant of Argument-Based 
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Research into both the jury decision-making and social-cognitive literature 
supports the assertion that jurors use peripheral cues such as expertise when processing 
testimony and other forms of evidence.57 Although traditionally viewed as automatic and 
often undetectable processes,58 efforts are being made to clarify the role of peripheral 
processes in decision-making.59 Greene and Ellis, for example, underscored that heuristic 
processes include conscious decisions and interpersonal inferences.60 Similarly, other 
scholars eschew the automatic and controlled process distinction and argue for a single 
route to persuasion.61 There is ample evidence that jurors are influenced, consciously or 
not, by simple cues such as witness attractiveness, age, gender, ethnicity, speech style, 
eye contact, and body language; all these factors can affect how jurors evaluate an expert 
witness’ credibility and the extent to which they are persuaded by that expert.62 
Persuasion, 41 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 847 (1981); Richard E. Petty & Duane T. Wegener, 
Attitude Change: Multiple Roles for Persuasion Variables, in THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 
323 (Daniel T. Gilbert, Susan T. Fiske & Gardner Lindzey eds., 4th ed. 1998). 
57 See, e.g., ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL (11th ed. 2011); Edie Greene & Leslie Ellis, Decision 
Making in Criminal Justice, in APPLYING PSYCHOLOGY TO CRIMINAL JUSTICE 183 (David Carson et al. 
eds., 2007); Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, The Story Model for Juror Decision-Making, in THE JURY 
TRIAL IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 192 (Douglas D. Koski ed., 2003); Steven J. Sherman, Charles M. Judd & 
Bernadette Park, Social Cognition, 40 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 281 (1989). 
58 Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 27 SCI. 1124 
(1974). 
59 See Felix Acker, New Findings on Unconscious Versus Conscious Thought in Decision Making: 
Additional Empirical Data and Meta-Analysis, 3 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 292 (2008). 
60 See Greene & Ellis, supra note 57. 
61 E.g., Arie W. Kruglanski & Erik P. Thompson, Persuasion by a Single Route: A View from the 
Unimodel, 2 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 83, 83 (1999). 
62 See, e.g., Stanley L. Brodsky et al., Credibility in the Courtroom: How Likeable Should an Expert 
Witness Be?, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 525 (2009) [hereinafter Brodsky et al., Credibility in the 
Courtroom]; Robert J. Cramer et al., Expert Witness Confidence and Juror Personality: Their Impact on 
Credibility and Persuasion in the Courtroom, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 63 (2009); Kenneth G. 
DeBono & Richard J. Harnish, Source Expertise, Source Attractiveness, and the Processing of Persuasive 
Information: A Functional Approach, 55 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 541, 541 (1988); Kim Giffin, 
The Contribution of Studies of Source Credibility to a Theory of Interpersonal Trust in the Communication 
Process, 68 PSYCHOL. BULL. 104 (1967); James E. Maddux & Ronald W. Rogers, Effects of Source 
Expertness, Physical Attractiveness, and Supporting Arguments on Persuasion: A Case of Brains over 
Beauty, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 235, 235 (1980); Gerald R. Miller & Judee K. Burgoon, 
Factors Affecting Assessments of Witness Credibility, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM (Norbert 
L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds., 1982); Tess M. S. Neal & Stanley L. Brodsky, Expert Witness Credibility 
as a Function of Eye Contact Behavior and Gender, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 1515 (2008). 
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But credibility is not a one-dimensional construct. Brodsky and colleagues 
provide a model of witness credibility in which four empirically supported characteristics 
of expert testimony — witness confidence, likeability, trustworthiness, and knowledge — 
act in concert to determine credibility.63 By exposing the characteristics underlying expert 
witness credibility, the model provides a practical tool for assessing the strengths and 
shortcomings of an expert witness.  
Behaviors related to confidence (i.e., “the degree of demonstrable self-assurance 
expert witnesses have in their general ability on the stand”),64 which is one of the four 
credibility domains, have been shown to influence testimonial outcomes.65  
Operationally, the behaviors include verbal confidence cues such as variations in expert 
and lay witness’ tone and style of speech (e.g., use of verbal hedges, intensifiers, 
hesitations), and nonverbal behaviors such as varied levels of eye contact, posture, 
63 See Brodsky et al., The Witness Credibility Scale, supra note 54, at 64; see also STANLEY L. BRODSKY, 
COPING WITH CROSS-EXAMINATION AND OTHER PATHWAYS TO EFFECTIVE TESTIMONY (2004). 
64 Cramer et al., supra note 62, at 64 (2009). 
65 More broadly, jurors’ perceptions of witness confidence have been well documented as positively 
correlated with credibility, accuracy, and believability ratings of witness testimony. See, e.g., R. C. L. 
Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A Replication and Extension, 
13 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 333 (1989); Elizabeth F. Loftus, Planting Misinformation in the Human Mind: A 30-
Year Investigation of the Malleability in Memory, 12 LEARNING & MEMORY 361 (2005); C.A. Elizabeth 
Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-Witness and Perseverance Effects, 
79 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 714 (1994); Veronica S. Tetterton & Amye R. Warren, Using Witness Confidence 
Can Impair the Ability to Detect Deception, 32 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 433 (2005); Bernard E. Whitley Jr. 
& Martin S. Greenberg, The Role of Eyewitness Confidence in Juror Perceptions of Credibility, 16 J. 
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 387 (1989).  Additional evidence for the relation between confidence, persuasion, 
and subsequent decision-making comes from fields related to computer information technology, advertising 
and consumer behavior, market economics, and sales consulting. E.g., Gerald D. Bell, Self-Confidence and 
Persuasion in Car Buying, 4 J. MARKETING RES. 46 (1967); Fergus Bolger, Briony D. Pulford, & Andrew 
M. Colman, Market Entry Decisions: Effects of Absolute and Relative Confidence, 55 EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL. 113 (2008); John M. Briggs, The Psychology of Successful Persuasion, 22 J. AM. SOC’Y C.L.U. 
51 (1968); Donald F. Cox & Raymond A. Bauer, Self-Confidence and Persuasibility in Women, 28 PUB. 
OPINION Q. 453 (1964); J. J. Jiang, G. Klein, & R. G. Vedder, Persuasive Expert Systems: The Influence of 
Confidence and Discrepancy, 16 COMPUTERS HUM. BEHAV. 99 (2000); Rosann L. Spiro & Barton A. 
Weitz, Adaptive Selling: Conceptualization, Measurement, and Nomological Validity, 27 J. MARKETING 
RES. 61 (1990); J. Frank Yates, Paul C. Price, Ju-Whei Lee, & James Ramirez, Good Probabilistic 
Forecasters: The ‘Consumer’s’ Perspective, 12 INT’L J. FORECAST 41 (1996). 
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gestures, and anxious movements.66 Others have studied lay witness confidence in a more 
naturalistic context, or have manipulated ratings of the communicators’ and eyewitness’ 
self-confidence by varying the presence of corroborating evidence and narrative 
statements, respectively.67   
From a psychological-process standpoint, the confidence heuristic model provides 
a sensible foundation for understanding how perceptions of confidence derived from 
confidence-related behaviors may operate in the courtroom. 68 The model equates higher 
levels of witness confidence with message receivers assuming greater competence, 
knowledge, and persuasive power.69 As with other elements of source credibility, 
contemporary research conceptualizes confidence as an influential factor that is 
consistent with theories regarding peripheral cues and their impact on persuasion.70  
However, not all jurors will perceive, or respond to, confidence-related cues in the 
same way. Social-psychological theories of message learning71 and reception yielding72 
66 See Brodsky et al., Credibility in the Courtroom, supra note 62, at 525; Michael Leippe, Andrew P. 
Manion, & Ann Romanczyk, Eyewitness Persuasion: How and How Well do Fact Finders Judge the 
Accuracy of Adults' and Children's Memory Reports?, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 181 (1997); 
Catha Maslow, Kathryn Yoselson, & Harvey London, Persuasiveness of Confidence Expressed via 
Language and Body Language, 10 BRIT. J. SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 234 (1971); Neal & Brodsky, supra 
note 62; WILLIAM M. O’BARR, LINGUISTIC EVIDENCE: LANGUAGE, POWER, AND STRATEGY IN THE 
COURTROOM (1982); Gary L. Wells & R. C. L. Lindsay, How do People Infer Accuracy of Eyewitness 
Memory? Studies of Performance and a Metamemory Analysis, in EVALUATING WITNESS EVIDENCE: 
RECENT PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 41 (Sally M.A. Lloyd-Bostock & Brian R. 
Clifford eds., 1983). 
67 Kimberley McClure & Jill J. Myers, Presentation at the Annual Meeting of the American Psychology-
Law Society, Vancouver, B.C.: The Two-Pronged Test Attenuates the Effects of Witness Confidence on 
Detectives’ Perceptions of Eyewitness Credibility (March 18, 2010); Harvey London et al., The Jury 
Method: How the Persuader Persuades, 34 PUB. OPINION Q. 171 (1970); Harvey London, Philip J. 
Meldman, & A. Van C. Lanckton, The Jury Method: Some Correlates of Persuading, 23 HUM. REL. 115 
(1970); HARVEY LONDON, PHILIP J. MELDMAN, & A. VAN C. LANCKTON, THE JURY METHOD (1970); Luus 
& Wells, supra note 65. 
68 See Paul C. Price & Eric R. Stone, Intuitive Evaluation of Likelihood Judgment Producers: Evidence for 
a Confidence Heuristic, 17 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 39 (2004). 
69 See generally J. FRANK YATES, JUDGMENT AND DECISION MAKING (1990). 
70 See Petty, Cacioppo & Goldman, supra note 56, at 847. 
71 See generally CARL IVAR HOVLAND ET AL., COMMUNICATION AND PERSUASION: PSYCHOLOGICAL 
STUDIES OF OPINION CHANGE (1953).   
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state that messages result in attitude change through specific mediating processes related 
to information perception (i.e., message reception) and acceptance (i.e., yielding to the 
message).73 Where a characteristic of the individual, the message, or both in interaction 
disrupt the process, no attitude change occurs. Thus, using the reception-yielding 
formulation, Chaiken and Eagly showed that changing the communication medium 
moderates receptivity of more subtle, non-verbal cues such as the communicator’s 
likeability conveyed in the message.74 Overall, the findings suggest that the factors which 
affect whether an argument or item of evidence is perceived, such as non-verbal cues, can 
alter how that message is received.  
The intersection of low juror extraversion and the subtlety of confidence-related 
behaviors likely represent an example of a combination of psychological and message 
characteristics that disrupt the processes of reception and yielding and thus prevent 
attitude change. Numerous lines of research provide converging evidence that 
extraversion is one of the primary dimensions of personality.75 Moreover, of the 
personality characteristics, several studies show that an individual’s level of extraversion 
can be reliably assessed by raters (e.g., jury consultants) through observation.76 
Furthermore, from a forensic standpoint, extraversion has been shown to be an important 
72 William J. McGuire, Personality and Attitude Change: An Information-Processing Theory, in 
PSYCHOLOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF ATTITUDES 171, 181-82 (Anthony G. Greenwald et al. eds., 1968). 
73 Petty, Cacioppo & Goldman, supra note 56, at 847; See generally ALICE H. EAGLY & SHELLY CHAIKEN, 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES (1993). 
74 See EAGLY & CHAIKEN, supra note 73. 
75 See John M. Digman, Personality Structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor Model, 41 ANN. REV. 
PSYCHOL. 417 (1990). 
76 Andrew Beer & David Watson, Personality Judgment at Zero Acquaintance: Agreement, Assumed 
Similarity, and Implicit Simplicity, 90 J. PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 250, 251 (2008); Peter Borkenau & 
Anette Liebler, Trait Inferences: Sources of Validity at Zero Acquaintance, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 645, 654 (1992). 
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variable in jury selection related to pro-defense verdicts and being elected as jury 
foreperson.77      
The “Big Five” personality classification of extraversion is perhaps the most 
widely recognized and researched conceptualization.78 From this perspective, extraverts 
are gregarious.79 They tend to be highly talkative, seek positive emotions from their 
environment, engage in high degrees of social and other activity, display assertiveness, 
and present interpersonal warmth.80 By contrast, introverts display the opposite 
tendencies.81 
 Experiments provide evidence for extraversion’s positive relation with the ability 
to interpret nonverbal messages when decoding such messages is a peripheral task or one 
of many concurrent tasks.82 For example, Akert and Panter found that extraverts’ higher 
tolerance for stimulation yielded an advantage in decoding—or accurately recognizing—
nonverbal messages, especially when the messages were highly complex.83 Further, 
Lieberman and Rosenthal hypothesized that the documented decoding advantage of the 
77 John Clark et al., Five-Factor Personality Traits, Jury Selection, and Case Outcomes in Criminal and 
Civil Cases, 34 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 641, 644 (2007). 
78 See, e.g., PAUL T. COSTA & ROBERT R. MCCRAE, THE NEO-PIR PROFESSIONAL MANUAL (1992) 
[hereinafter COSTA & MCCRAE, NEO-PIR PROFESSIONAL MANUAL]; Paul T. Costa & Robert R. McCrae, 
Normal Personality Assessment in Clinical Practice: The NEO Personality Inventory, 4 PSYCHOL. 
ASSESSMENT 5 (1992) [hereinafter Costa & McCrae, Normal Personality Assessment in Clinical Practice]; 
Robert J. Cramer et al., A Five-Factor Analysis of Spirituality in Young Adults: Preliminary Evidence, 43 
RES. SOC. SCI. STUD. RELIGION 43 (2008); Lewis R. Goldberg, A Broad-Bandwidth, Public Domain, 
Personality Inventory Measuring the Lower-Level Facets of Several Five-Factor Models, in PERSONALITY 
PSYCHOLOGY IN EUROPE 7 (Ivan Mervielde et al. eds., 1999); ROBERT R. MCCRAE & PAUL T. COSTA, 
PERSONALITY IN ADULTHOOD: A FIVE-FACTOR THEORY PERSPECTIVE (2003).   
79 See Costa & McCrae, Normal Personality Assessment in Clinical Practice, supra note 78, at 7. 
80 See id.; COSTA & MCCRAE, NEO-PIR PROFESSIONAL MANUAL, supra note 78. 
81 Costa & McCrae, Normal Personality Assessment in Clinical Practice, supra note 78, at 7. 
82 Robin M. Akert & Abigayl T. Panter, Extraversion and the Ability to Decode Nonverbal Communication, 
9 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 965 (1988); Hillary Anger Elfenbein et al., Emotional 
Intelligence and the Recognition of Emotion from Facial Expressions, in THE WISDOM IN FEELINGS: 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PROCESSES IN EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE 37 (Lisa Feldman Barrett & Peter Salovey eds., 
2002); Matthew D. Lieberman & Robert Rosenthal, Why Introverts Can’t Always Tell Who Likes Them: 
Multitasking and Nonverbal Decoding, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 294 (2001). 
83 See Akert & Panter, supra note 82, at 970. 
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extravert would occur primarily in naturalistic settings, because such settings inherently 
involve multitasking.84 A meta-analysis of their experiments provides support for their 
assertion; extraverts are significantly more accurate at decoding nonverbal messages 
when participants are multitasking, but not when participants’ attention is focused on 
decoding nonverbal communications. Thus, based upon existing psychological theory, 
there is ample reason to believe that shy jurors and gregarious jurors will respond 
differently to a witness’s level of confidence in his or her testimony.   
 B. Two Original Studies 
 To our knowledge, no study had tested this hypothesis. Accordingly, in two 
studies we examined whether jurors’ level of extraversion moderates the persuasive 
impact of expert witness confidence relative to the combined effects of the remaining 
elements of the credibility model (i.e., likeability, trustworthiness, and knowledge).85 In 
the first, we assessed the relation between juror extraversion and witness testimonial 
confidence, baseline credibility, and overall credibility in a correlational design. Study II 
replicated and extended Study I by examining the relation between these variables when 
witness testimonial confidence was behaviorally manipulated. 
  1. Hypotheses. 
Hypothesis one (H1). Overall credibility will be a significant positive predictor of 
death penalty assignment. A positive relationship is hypothesized because the expert in 
our study testifies that the defendant is dangerous and will continue to present a danger to 
84 See Lieberman & Rosenthal, supra note 82, at 294-95. 
85 For ease of reference, in the remainder of the paper we refer to the combination of all four elements in 
the credibility model as “overall credibility,” the confidence element alone as “testimonial confidence,” and 
the combination of likeability, trustworthiness, and knowledge as “baseline credibility.”   
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society. Thus, the more credible jurors find the expert, the more we would expect them to 
agree with the expert. 
Hypothesis two (H2). Extraversion will moderate the overall persuasive effects of 
testimonial confidence and baseline credibility on death penalty assignment. Specifically, 
both an expert witness’ testimonial confidence and baseline credibility will play a role in 
the likelihood that the participant assigns the death penalty for extraverted participants. 
However, for participants who are low in extraversion (i.e., introverted), the likelihood of 
assigning the death penalty will be affected primarily by baseline credibility, not 
testimonial confidence.  In short, we predicted a significant three-way interaction 
between testimonial confidence, juror extraversion, and baseline credibility. 
 2. Study I: Exploratory Analysis of Expert Testimony and Juror 
Extraversion  
 
Method 
Participants  
A total of 209 mock jurors were drawn from introductory psychology courses at a 
large, public university. Their mean age was 19.08 years (SD = 2.15). The sample was 
predominantly female (85%) and primarily Caucasian (n = 177), followed by African-
American (n = 26), Asian-American (n = 3), and ‘Other’ (n = 3).       
Measures 
The dataset from Stanley Brodsky and his colleagues’ 2009 experiment86 was 
analyzed for Study I in the present investigation. The measures described below were 
those used to gather data for the original study.   
86 See Brodsky et al., Credibility in the Courtroom, supra note 62. 
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 Demographics.  Demographic information was collected for participant age, 
gender, ethnicity, juror service experience, and testifying experience.    
 Witness confidence and credibility. Witness confidence was assessed using the 
Witness Credibility Scale.87 The scale is composed of twenty paired adjectives, each 
rated on a 10-point bipolar scale.88 Based on expert witness research, factor analyses 
yielded four subscales: Confidence, Trustworthiness, Likability, and Knowledge.89  
These four factors can be aggregated for a total witness credibility score to measure 
overall credibility.90 In four separate studies, subscale internal consistencies for the 
factors have been found to be high: Confidence (α = .89 to .94), Trustworthiness (α = .92 
to .98), Likability (α = .86 to .94), and Knowledge (α = .86 to .96). The overall credibility 
alpha values range from .91 to .97. Of these four factors, the present investigation focuses 
primarily on a comparison between the effects of Confidence (i.e., testimonial 
confidence) and a summed total score of the other three credibility subscales (i.e., 
baseline credibility). 
 Extraversion. Mock juror extraversion was measured with Goldberg’s Five-Factor 
Items.91 This instrument includes fifty statements, each rated on a five-point Likert 
scale.92 Five overarching traits are assessed: emotional stability (α = .86), extraversion (α 
= .87), openness to experience (α = .84), agreeableness (α = .82), and conscientiousness 
(α = .79). The extraversion scale was the scale of interest in our study.  
87 See generally Brodsky et al., The Witness Credibility Scale, supra note 54. 
88 Id. at 899. 
89 Id. at 898-99. 
90 Id. at 899-900. 
91 See Goldberg, supra note 78. For a discussion of personality measurements generally, see International 
Personality Item Pool (IPIP), A Scientific Collaboratory for the Development of Advanced Measures of 
Personality Traits and Other Individual Differences (2001), http://ipip.ori.org/ (last visited December 18, 
2012). 
92 See Brodsky et al., The Witness Credibility Scale, supra note 54, at 902. 
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 Sentencing decision. Expert testimony featured a witness conveying an opinion 
consistent with assignment of the death penalty, as opposed to life in prison without 
parole. Sentencing recommendation was defined as mock juror ratings of their likelihood 
of assigning the death penalty. Likelihood of assigning the death penalty was assessed 
using a 10-point Likert scale with endpoints labeled 1 = “Very Unlikely” and 10 = 
“Extremely Likely.” 
Procedure  
Participants received brief jury instructions, noting that they were to rate an 
observed expert witness and make sentencing decisions based on the witness’s 
recommendations. Participants then watched a videotape of a mock expert witness 
testifying concerning results of a psychological evaluation on the violence risk of a 
defendant convicted of capital murder. They then completed the demographic, 
personality, and credibility measures. All participants were notified of their rights as a 
research participant and debriefed.      
Results 
 Linear regression with the criterion variable of participants’ sentencing decision 
was implemented to test H1. The main predictor was overall witness credibility, 
controlling for age, gender, support for the death penalty, and extraversion. The overall 
model was significant, F(5, 203) = 27.55, p < .001, R2 = .40. As predicted, perception of 
overall credibility was significant (β = .41, p < .001), and the positive beta weight 
indicated a positive association between credibility and assigning the death penalty, 
consistent with our prediction.   
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 To test H2, a regression model with participants’ sentencing decision as the 
criterion measure was used. Predictors included ratings of expert witness testimonial 
confidence, ratings of expert witness baseline credibility, participants’ level of 
extraversion, as well as the two- and three-way interactions between these variables. The 
model also included controls for age, gender, and support for the death penalty. The 
overall model was significant, F(10, 198) = 16.06, p < .001, R2 = .45. Baseline credibility 
was a significant positive predictor (β = .52, p < .001), qualified by a marginal trend 
higher order interaction with participants’ level of extraversion (β = -.14, p = .08). 
Similarly, the interaction between witness testimonial confidence and juror extraversion 
yielded a marginal trend (β = .24, p = .06). Finally, these results were qualified by a 
marginal trend in the predicted three-way interaction (β = -.41, p = .09). 
 Given that the predicted three-way interaction only approached significance, a 
formal analysis of the simple slopes could be misleading.93 Nevertheless, because the 
interaction was predicted and because for this study we relied on individual differences in 
perception, we compared the relative effects of testimonial confidence and baseline 
credibility on death penalty recommendations for introverts and extraverts for exploratory 
purposes. The decision patterns were consistent with those described in H2 (see Figure 
1).  
93 Jeremy F. Dawson & Andreas W. Richter, Probing Three-Way Interactions in Moderated Multiple 
Regression: Development and Application of a Slope Difference Test, 91 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 917, 918 
(2006). 
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 Figure 1 displays that expert witnesses perceived as low in testimonial confidence 
had a differential impact on the sentencing recommendations of introverts and extraverts. 
When participants were introverted, their perceptions of an expert’s testimonial 
confidence appeared to have no impact on how the expert’s testimony influenced his or 
her sentencing recommendations. In comparison, the likelihood of assigning the death 
penalty for participants who were extraverted did not cross the mid-point of the scale, 
except when the expert witness was thought to be high in both baseline credibility and 
testimonial confidence.    
Discussion 
 Study I offers some preliminary evidence for the integration of the confidence 
heuristic model, source credibility, and perceiver (mock juror) extraversion in that they 
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interact to affect juror decision-making. These findings extend current knowledge in the 
confidence heuristic literature by showing that extraversion moderates use of peripheral-
type cues from an expert witness. From the perspective of message learning and reception 
yielding, moderation analyses suggest that extraverts tend to receive and be persuaded by 
confidence in a different manner when compared to introverts. Extraverts rated witnesses 
who were low in testimonial confidence as also low in credibility, possibly due to 
attention to peripheral cues of testimony behavior. To the contrary, introverts remained 
influenced by low confident witnesses.  
 The obvious limitation of Study I is the correlational design. We did not 
manipulate the witness’s testimonial confidence, and thus causal inferences cannot be 
drawn. To improve this limitation and to extend our findings, an experimental design was 
subsequently employed in Study II.   
 3. Study II: Experimental Investigation of Witness Testimony and 
Juror Extraversion 
 
Method 
Participants  
This sample was comprised of 314 mock jurors drawn from introductory 
psychology courses at a large public university. The mean age of the sample was 18.94 
years (SD = 2.59). The sample included 100 males and 214 females (68% female). 
Participants reported their ethnicity as Caucasian (n = 261), African-American (n = 38), 
Latin-American (n = 10), Asian-American (n = 2), and other (n = 3).     
Measures  
The demographic questionnaire, measure of extraversion, and sentencing scale 
used in Study I were identical to those used in Study II.   
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 Testimonial confidence manipulation. The witness’s testimonial confidence was 
divided into three distinct categories (i.e., low, medium, and high). Each level of 
testimonial confidence was defined by a group of naturalistic behavioral cues associated 
with that level of confidence, originally developed by Cramer, Brodsky, and DeCoster.94 
Examples of cues associated with low testimonial confidence include an unstable tone of 
voice and fixated eye contact.95 Medium testimonial confidence cues include stability in 
voice tone, narrative responses to questions, flexible eye contact, and good posture.96 
High testimonial confidence cues are behaviors such as rapid rate of speech, leaning 
forward, and expressing certainty in all conclusions.97 
Procedure  
The procedure was similar to that of Study I. The only significant departure was 
that participants observed one of three randomly assigned videotaped conditions of mock 
expert witness testimony in which the expert conformed to one of the three levels of 
testimonial confidence discussed above (i.e., low, medium, or high confidence).    
Results 
Linear regression was used to test H1, with participants’ sentencing decision as 
the criterion variable. The main predictor was expert witness overall credibility, 
controlling for age, gender, support for the death penalty, and juror extraversion. The 
model was significant, F(5, 308) = 71.65, p < .001; R2 = .54. As predicted, overall 
credibility was positively associated with likelihood of assigning the death penalty (β = 
.62, p < .001).   
94 See Cramer et al., supra note 62, at 64-65.  
95 Id. at 64. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 64-65. 
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 To test H2, participants’ sentencing decisions were regressed on participants’ 
level of juror extraversion, two indicator-coded variables for the testimonial confidence 
conditions (medium testimonial confidence was coded as the reference category), and 
ratings of expert witness credibility, as well as the two- and three-way interactions 
between these variables. As with Study I, the model also included controls for age, 
gender, and support for the death penalty. In the full model (F(14, 299) = 27.45, p < .001; 
R2 = .56), both baseline credibility and the low-testimonial confidence conditions were 
significant predictors (β = .42, p < .001; β = -.25, p < .001, respectively). However, as 
hypothesized, these effects were qualified by a significant three-way interaction between 
level of juror extraversion, expert witness baseline credibility, and the low-testimonial 
confidence condition (β = .12, p = .006). Neither the high-confidence condition, nor any 
of its interaction terms were significant. 
 Next, following the recommendation of Dawson and Richter,98 we assessed 
whether the variables in the significant three-way interaction conformed to the specific 
pattern postulated in H2. The test involves calculating the significance of the differences 
between the simple slopes of the four lines defined by predicted values on the dependent 
measure at each of the combinations of extraversion (plus or minus one SD) and baseline 
confidence (plus or minus one SD) with endpoints in the low testimonial confidence and 
medium/high testimonial confidence conditions.99 The results were consistent with H2 
and the pattern observed in Study I. In particular, differences in testimonial confidence 
98 See Dawson & Richter, supra note 93, at 917 (2006). 
99 In light of the high testimonial confidence condition not being significantly different from the medium 
testimonial confidence condition, we omitted the indicator codes and interactions from the model used to 
compute coefficients, variances, and covariances for the simple slopes analysis, effectively combining the 
medium- and high-testimonial confidence conditions into one group. As expected, the results from this 
model were not substantively different from those reported above. 
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had a significantly greater effect on extraverts’ likelihood of assigning the death penalty 
than introverts when baseline credibility was high (t = -2.49, p = .01). Moreover, the 
results suggest that for high extraverts, level of testimonial confidence and level of 
baseline credibility have almost a multiplicative effect on the likelihood of awarding the 
death penalty (t = -1.78, p = .08). In contrast, this is not the case for participants who are 
low in extraversion (t = 1.40, p = .16).   
 To present the follow-up analysis in a more intuitive format, we divided the 
sample at the median level of extraversion and, for each sub-sample, re-ran the regression 
model described above omitting juror extraversion and its interaction terms, as well as 
omitting the indicator code for the high-confidence condition and its interaction terms. 
Consistent with the analysis reported above, the results suggest that both baseline 
credibility and testimonial confidence influence the decisions of extraverts, while only 
baseline confidence influences introverts. In the extravert subsample, baseline credibility 
and the low confidence condition were significant predictors (β = .53, p < .001; β = -.33, 
p < .001), as was the two-way interaction between them (β = -.17, p = .04). In contrast, in 
the introvert subsample, only baseline credibility emerged as a significant predictor (β = 
.35, p < .001). 
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 Figure 2 illustrates the pattern of results supporting H2. As was the case with 
Study I, the mean likelihood of assigning the death penalty for introverted participants 
was related to perceptions of an expert witness’s baseline credibility, such that increased 
baseline credibility was associated with a greater reported likelihood of awarding the 
death penalty. Different levels of the witness’s testimonial confidence did not lead to 
different sentencing decisions for introverts. However, for extraverted participants, the 
witness’s testimonial confidence moderated baseline credibility and sentencing decisions. 
Extravert exposure to the low-testimonial confidence condition affected likelihood of 
awarding the death penalty in that this likelihood was significantly lower than in the 
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medium- and high-confidence conditions. Thus, when the expert witness was rated high 
on baseline credibility, the low-testimonial confidence condition reduced the mean 
reported likelihood of assigning the death penalty only for those participants who scored 
relatively high on extraversion.   
Discussion 
 The fact that expert witness overall credibility influenced perceiver decisions in 
this context is not entirely surprising given previous findings on the potency of source 
credibility.100 Moreover, the four components of Brodsky and colleagues’ witness 
credibility model101 have received empirical support in previous studies that are 
consistent with results from the present investigation.102 For the first time, however, this 
study shows how testimonial confidence, one of the four components of the model, 
functions in relation to perceiver extraversion. In particular, the more gregarious, or 
extraverted, the perceiver (i.e., the mock juror), the more affected he or she is by the 
testimonial confidence of the messenger (i.e., the expert witness). Extraverted mock 
jurors, who, by definition, engage their social world to a high degree and seek positive 
emotions from these experiences, appear to read and rely upon witnesses’ confidence-
related behaviors. If they see the witness as lacking in testimonial confidence, such mock 
jurors rate the witness as lower in overall credibility and subsequently, are less likely to 
agree with the content of their testimony.   
 By comparison, introverted, or shy, mock jurors have a different reaction to non-
confident experts: at each level of baseline credibility, they treat non-confident witnesses 
as just as credible as confident witnesses, and are as likely to agree with non-confident 
100 See, e.g., Miller & Burgoon, supra note 62; Neal & Brodsky, supra note 62, at 1515. 
101 Brodsky et al., The Witness Credibility Scale, supra note 62, at 892; cf. BRODSKY, supra note 63. 
102 See, e.g., Neal & Brodsky, supra note 62, at 1515. 
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witnesses as they are with confident witnesses. From a message learning theory 
standpoint, introverts are probably less influenced by confidence cues.103 Rather, they pay 
more attention to the substance of testimony. This would explain why introverts still 
perceived low confident witnesses as relatively credible and believable when the baseline 
credibility of the witness was high. Extraverts, on the other hand, are likely to attend 
more to nonverbal behavioral cues associated with confidence, as is suggested by prior 
research in this area, and to be persuaded by those cues.104 
III. Analysis of Criterion for Balancing Interests in Jury Service 
 As discussed in Part I, recent Supreme Court jurisprudence sets the traditional 
common law privilege to strike jurors believed to be biased, irrespective of the basis for 
or veracity of that belief, against an equal-protection right of prospective jurors not to be 
struck from juries on certain grounds.105 The conflicting interests in who serves or does 
not serve on a jury inform and fuel the ongoing debate over the propriety of so-called  
scientific jury selection. Drawing on our empirical research, we analyze the underlying 
elements of the competing interests in this section. We analyzed the specific example of 
striking prospective jurors from the venire based upon evidence of their respective level 
of the personality trait extraversion. In doing so, we argue that while jury selection based 
upon personality characteristics certainly falls within the traditional scope of practice for 
the peremptory challenge, the traditional justification does not necessarily apply. Rather, 
the alternate criteria of tradition and institutional inertia best describes how judges treat 
peremptory challenges and scientific jury selection.  Moreover, strikes on the basis of 
103 HOVLAND ET AL., supra note 71. 
104 See, e.g., Akert & Panter, supra note 82, at 965. 
105 See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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traits like extraversion present few if any of the threats to equal protection that motivated 
the Supreme Court to limit the peremptory challenge.106 Applying these criteria, we argue 
that striking jurors on the basis of personality characteristics like extraversion is 
appropriate.   
 A. A Hypothetical Case Study   
 To ground our analysis and lend some flesh to the theoretical bones of the 
research results, we begin with a hypothetical felony murder case: The defendant is 
charged with killing a man during an attempted robbery, a capital offense in Texas, the 
state where the alleged crime took place.107 Although the defendant has pled not guilty, 
his counsel believes he will likely be found guilty, because of an informal confession by 
defendant while incarcerated for another crime along with the corroborating evidence. In 
light of the particular facts of the case and the absence of any additional record of 
violence by the defendant, counsel also believes the defendant can avoid the death 
penalty by convincing the jury in the penalty phase that he is not a further danger to the 
community. To do so, the defendant must rebut the State’s expert witness, a clinical 
psychologist, who will testify on the question of future dangerousness.   
Despite the weak evidence on this question, defendant’s counsel believes that the 
expert will appear to be particularly confident in his opinion on this question. After 
consulting with a jury selection expert, defendant’s counsel learns that jurors who are 
high in extraversion are particularly sensitive to an expert witness’s level of confidence 
when deciding how much weight to give that testimony.  Those low in extraversion (i.e., 
106 Cf. id. at 85 (although the Court has stated that “the state denies a black defendant equal protection of 
the laws when it puts him on trial before a jury from which members of his race have been purposefully 
excluded,” it has never taken a similar position with regard to jurors who share a defendant’s personality 
characteristics). 
107 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(2) (West 2008). 
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introverted jurors) tend to disregard the witnesses’ confidence. On the recommendation 
of the consultant, prior to and during voir dire, defendant’s counsel has an assistant 
observe the prospective jurors, note which ones seem to be keeping to themselves and 
which tend to engage with those around them, and rank them on this basis. Later, 
defendant’s counsel uses three of defendant’s peremptory challenges to strike prospective 
jurors who were rated as particularly talkative and engaged. This leaves a panel of jurors 
thought to be average to low in extraversion.108 If the theory works as expected, 
defendant may still be found guilty, but can hope to avoid the death penalty. 
 B. Propriety of the Peremptory Strikes for Extraversion    
 The hypothetical case provides an example of how the results of research into 
psychological traits that moderate receptivity to persuasive messages, such as the studies 
reported above, might affect a criminal proceeding. Three jurors who would not 
otherwise have been targeted for peremptory challenge were struck based on the research 
and informal estimates of one of their psychological traits. While the result was 
consistent with what the research would suggest, it is impossible to tell whether striking 
those jurors was a determinative factor in this particular case, because so much 
psychological research operates at an aggregate level.109 
108 The critical issues for attorneys in this assessment is whether a witness’s confidence in his or her 
testimony is likely to accurately reflect the strength of the underlying evidence and, if not, which favors 
their side of the case. If the two coincide, then the juror’s level of extraversion would not matter.  To the 
extent an expert witness is expected to appear confident (or lacking in confidence) irrespective of the 
strength of the underlying evidence, extraverted jurors will, on the whole, tend to be more (or less) 
persuaded by them than jurors who are introverted. This is the situation in the hypothetical.  Those of us 
who are trial consultants would not generally recommend relying upon weak evidence and a confident 
expert, as the prosecutor in the hypothetical is doing.  However, if an attorney has elected to do so, the 
research suggests extraverted jurors would be preferable.  
109 See, e.g., David L. Faigman & John Monahan, Psychological Evidence at the Dawn of the Law’s 
Scientific Age, 56 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 631, 633 (2005) (Analyzing “the already raging debate among 
psychologists regarding what methods are adequate to study human behavior.”); DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY §§ 1.17-1.40 (1997); David 
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 More importantly for the argument in this article, the hypothetical also illustrates 
how, in practice, cases involving scientific jury selection may not align with the primary 
public policy considerations marshaled in support of or in opposition to interests in jury 
service. In fact, the historical public policy rationale for an unfettered peremptory 
challenge does not apply to this situation. Without the benefit of the jury consultant’s 
advice, the defendant would not have perceived the relatively extraverted venire members 
as biased against him. Indeed, it is highly questionable whether a tendency to place high 
persuasive weight on behavioral cues suggesting witnesses lack confidence in their 
testimony even constitutes a “bias” in the sense traditionally envisioned by Blackstone, 
the courts, and other commentators. Thus, absent the information that introverts are less 
affected by puffery, there is little if any danger that the defendant would have less faith in 
the judicial process because of an inability to strike the three introverted jurors.  
 The same is true for the broad public-policy rationale supporting a juror’s right 
not to be excluded from service. The three prospective jurors in the hypothetical may 
otherwise have served on the jury. Following the Supreme Court's rationale, they would 
have had the opportunity to participate and benefit from the trial and sentencing process 
as an educational experience. But had the defendant’s counsel not struck the three 
introverted jurors, the three jurors who replaced them may have missed the same 
opportunity for participation. 
In terms of the venire, the incidence of the benefits (and burdens) of jury service 
is a zero-sum game in which participation by some precludes participation by others. In 
the aggregate, however, the demand for jurors is typically far lower than the supply, 
L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not: Assessing the Value of Social Science to the Law as Science and 
Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005, 1015-17 (1989). 
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which operates as an upward constraint on the potential benefits of an inclusive jury 
system for a democratic society. So long as jury service is not systematically distributed 
among select sub-groups of citizens, the same total benefits ought to accrue to all of 
society irrespective of the particular individual jurors who ultimately participate. Thus, 
the central public-policy rationale does not depend upon the selection outcome of 
prospective jurors as individuals, but to them as representatives of the broader citizenry. 
To the extent psychological characteristics involved in the peremptory challenge 
determination are functionally randomly distributed among citizens, selection for juror 
exclusion based upon those characteristics is unrelated to that rationale.        
 Moreover, with respect to public perceptions of justice, because level of 
extraversion is not a traditional basis for systematic disenfranchisement, it is unlikely that 
the members of a democratic society will lose confidence in the legal system based upon 
knowledge of its use to identify and strike prospective jurors in a small number of 
criminal trials. Consistent with this conclusion and belying its reliance on the high 
rhetoric and political theory favoring a broadly inclusive jury pool,110 the Supreme Court 
later indicated that the civic protection from peremptory challenge extends only to a 
party’s use of “group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice.”111 
Typically, this includes only those suspect social categories that merit strict scrutiny (e.g., 
race, ethnicity, and national origin) and intermediate scrutiny (e.g., gender and perhaps 
110 Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 403 (1991). 
111 J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994) (recognizing a juror’s right not to be stricken 
based upon gender). 
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illegitimacy),112 not specific psychological traits that research shows may affect 
receptivity to persuasive messages.113   
 Where the basic justifications for exclusion and inclusion in jury service do not 
apply (as in the case of peremptory challenges based upon psychological traits like the 
level of extraversion), how ought the appropriate balance between competing interests be 
struck? We identify two alternative criteria. The first concerns the familiar notion in the 
U.S. criminal justice system that criminal proceedings ought to be weighed substantially 
in favor of criminal defendants, i.e., “it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let 
a guilty man go free.”114 Defendants, for example, are said to be innocent until proven 
guilty, a presumption that has been lauded as “undoubted law, axiomatic and 
elementary,”115 “part of the foundation of our system of criminal justice,”116 and a 
normative mandate “that society ought to speak of accused men as innocent, and treat 
them as innocent, until they have been properly convicted after all they have to offer in 
their defense has been carefully weighed.”117 Adding effect to this verbiage is a set of 
procedural protections for criminal defendants, the most significant of which are that, in 
most cases, the state carries the burden of proof and a high standard to relieve that 
burden: beyond a reasonable doubt.118 
112 See id. at 135-37; see also Save Palisade FruitLands v. Todd, 279 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002) 
(enumerating suspect categories). 
113 See, e.g., Collin P. Wedel, Twelve Angry (and Stereotyped) Jurors: How Courts Can Use Scientific Jury 
Selection to End Discriminatory Peremptory Challenges, 7 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 293, 294 (2011); Rachel 
Hartje, A Jury of Your Peers?: How Jury Consulting May Actually Help Trial Lawyers Resolve 
Constitutional Limitations Imposed on the Selection of Juries, 41 CAL. W. L. REV. 479 (2005). 
114 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970). 
115 Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895). 
116 United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1363 (2d Cir. 1985). 
117 Laurence H. Tribe, Trial by Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 
1329, 1371 (1971) (emphasis in original); see generally William S. Laufer, The Rhetoric of Innocence, 70 
WASH. L. REV. 329 (1995) (discussing the presumption of innocence). 
118 See Laufer, supra note 117, at 334. 
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 Applied to the case of juror extraversion, a norm of balancing criminal procedure 
in favor of defendants could justify the procedural discretion that enabled the peremptory 
strike described in the hypothetical.119 Many procedural protections for defendants 
supported by the norm are specific and institutionalized (e.g., reasonable doubt).120 
Theoretically, affording defendants the procedural latitude necessary to identify and act 
upon novel theories of what jury composition might yield the best outcome for them 
could serve the same purpose. In the hypothetical, the defendant’s counsel believed that 
jurors who were higher in extraversion would be more persuaded by the prosecutor’s 
expert witness. Estimating the prospective jurors’ levels of extraversion and exercising 
three of the available strikes to those he thought to be particularly high in that 
characteristic was thus, merely the enactment of a strategy to obtain a more favorable 
outcome for the defendant within the basic procedural framework of a capital trial.     
As a justification, however, a norm of favoring defendants is overly broad. In fact, 
the effects of axioms like the presumption of innocence generally do not extend beyond 
specific institutionalized protections.121 Moreover, the application of this norm to 
discretionary practice fails to account for a substantial portion of established practice.122 
While much of the rhetoric concerning the exercise of the peremptory challenge focuses 
on criminal defendants, as discussed above, in practice prosecutors are afforded the same 
privilege, including the ability to challenge peremptory strikes made by defendants. A 
norm of favoritism toward the defendant cannot support a procedural rule that affords 
prosecutors a parity of strategic discretion. 
119 See discussion supra, Part III.A. 
120 See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970). 
121 Id. at 334-40. 
122 Id. at 337. 
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 A second alternative set of criteria is tradition and the conservative nature of 
reform in legal procedure. As embodied in fundamental principles like stare decisis, the 
common law legal system is fundamentally bound to and constrained by its history.123 To 
provide notice of the extant legal rules and to prevent judges from treating similarly 
situated parties differently over time, our system contains strong norms of adherence to 
prior decisions.124 Where doctrinal and procedural reforms have been created through 
judicial action, they have tended to take shape incrementally.125 
The peremptory challenge privilege has far deeper roots in the history of legal 
practice than a juror’s right to be free from exclusion.126 Accordingly, absent the 
identification or development of a strong, countervailing interest that was not present or 
recognized historically, the scope of the peremptory challenge should not be curtailed. To 
the extent a newly recognized interest exists, under this criterion, the traditional practice 
ought to be curtailed only to the extent necessary to accommodate that interest.   
 The advent of concerted legal intervention to protect particular groups, such as 
racial minorities and women, from systematic discrimination is such an interest. 
However, protecting historically disadvantaged groups does not require a general 
curtailing of the privilege to strike prospective jurors for any reason other than their race, 
gender, or status as members of a protected group.127 Taking the hypothetical case as an 
example, even where the three jurors who were struck all minority women, the fact that 
the process and criterion used to identify them were race- and gender-neutral means 
123 Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in A 
Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 650 (2001). 
124 Id.  
125 See id. at 648-50.  But see id. at 641-43 (describing relatively rare periods of rapid legal change). 
126 See, e.g., supra Part I.A–B. 
127 E.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85-86 (1986). 
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peremptory challenges need not be restricted to satisfy the interest of protecting members 
of historically disadvantaged groups.128 Therefore, both sides should be free to use 
psychological research examining juror extraversion and jurors’ susceptibility to expert 
witnesses when selecting jurors for peremptory challenge.129   
 Unlike the prior public policy grounds, this reasoning is also wholly consistent 
with what is observed in practice. Courts have tended to act in support of a party’s 
privilege to exclude prospective jurors from service. As noted above, the Supreme Court 
has extended the right, limiting the basis for peremptory challenges only to jurors’ race, 
gender, and ethnicity.130 Federal appellate courts have added religious affiliation to the 
list.131 More importantly for our discussion, however, is that federal courts have 
affirmatively declined to recognize a substantive limit to the exercise of peremptory 
challenges based on a variety of criteria.132 These include some social categories, such as 
a juror’s age133 and disability,134 which are recognized in other contexts as bases for 
128 The relationship between extraversion and suspect demographic characteristics such as race and gender 
is nominal. See e.g., Lewis R. Goldberg, Dennis Sweeney, Peter F. Merenda, & John Edward Hughes, Jr.,  
Demographic Variables and Personality: The Effects of Gender, Age, Education, and Ethnic/Racial Status 
on Self-Descriptions of Personality Attributes, 24 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES 393, 401 
(1998). 
129 To be sure, there are much harder cases.  For example, the personality trait of conscientiousness (i.e., 
thorough, principled) has been found to be modestly lower in African-Americans than White Americans.  
See id. at 401. Thus, in the aggregate, selection of jurors based upon estimates of this characteristic could 
affect the racial composition of juries.  We leave exploration of the question of how large the effect would 
be and whether it would justify curtailing the ability of litigants to exercise peremptory challenges under 
circumstances where the exclusionary effects of the criterion and method differently impact members of 
various protected groups for future analyses.     
130 See Batson, 476 U.S. 79; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
131 E.g., United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1991). 
132 See, e.g., KEVIN F. O’MALLEY ET AL., 1 FED. JURY PRAC. & INSTR. § 4:9 (6th ed. 2006) (collecting race-
neutral justifications for striking jurors). 
133 United States v. Helmstetter, 479 F.3d 750, 754 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Even if not strictly bound by this 
precedent, we see no reason to reexamine it in light of the fact that every other circuit to address the issue 
has rejected the argument that jury-selection procedures discriminating on the basis of age violate equal 
protection.”). 
134 United States v. Watson, 483 F.3d 828, 833-35 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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illegal discrimination,135 as well as relatively stable characteristics such as physical 
appearance,136 and occupation,137 or the lack thereof.138 In addition, parties may use 
peremptory challenges to strike jurors based on evidence of a variety of psychological 
characteristics, including a person’s attitudes and beliefs (e.g., support for marijuana 
legalization,139 opposition to capital punishment,140 or the unwillingness, on religious 
grounds, to pass judgment on others141), personality traits (e.g., the tendency to 
exaggerate),142 and hostility.  
It is common for lawyers or judges to ask prospective jurors about the 
particularities of their lives and viewpoints for the purpose of deciding what biases they 
may have. Exposure to pretrial publicity,143 attitudes towards insurance,144 feelings about 
damages for emotional suffering,145 and attitudes toward sex offenders146 are all 
appropriate topics of inquiry during voir dire. Finally, echoing Blackstone, at least one 
court has recognized that it is appropriate for parties to estimate relevant attitudes and 
traits of prospective jurors from observations of their behavior: 
135 See Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1967); Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). 
136 United States v. Roan Eagle, 867 F.2d 436, 441 (8th Cir. 1989) (juror appeared “slovenly”). 
137 United States v. Maxwell, 473 F.3d 868, 872 (8th Cir. 2007) (juror was a teacher). 
138 Alverio v. Sam's Warehouse Club, Inc., 253 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2001) (“We have approved the 
exclusion of potential jurors because of their professions, and their lack of a profession. We have also held 
that inadequate education and business experience are nondiscriminatory justifications for excluding 
prospective jurors.”) (citations omitted). 
139 United States v. Prince, 647 F.3d 1257, 1261-64 (10th Cir. 2011). 
140  United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 725, 729 (5th Cir. 1992) (Jurors believed capital punishment is 
never appropriate: “Political belief is not the overt and immutable characteristic that race is, and we decline 
to extend the Batson line of cases to this case.”). 
141 See, e.g., United States v. DeJesus, 347 F.3d 500, 506 (3d Cir. 2003) (Acceptable for prosecution to 
strike one juror based upon indications that he was devoutly Christian, forgiving, and would “hesitate to 
pass judgment on someone.”); United States v. Stafford, 136 F.3d 1109, 1114 (7th Cir. 1998). 
142 Hayes v. Woodford, 301 F.3d 1054, 1082 (9th Cir. 2002) (Declaring race-neutral reason to strike juror 
who “was prone to exaggeration, including a comment that he had a ‘photostatic’ mind.”). 
143 Thomas v. State, 452 So. 2d 899, 902 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984). 
144 Purdy v. Gulf Breeze Enterprises, 403 So. 2d 1325, 1330-31 (Fla. 1981). 
145 Carver v. Neidermayer, 920 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006). 
146 Hunter v. State, 585 So. 2d 220 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991). 
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It is well to note that feelings are not always expressed in words, and, 
indeed, may be clearly manifested by gestures and facial expressions. A 
grimace or stare may express hostility or displeasure quite as clearly as 
words shouted across a room. Much literature may be found on 
interpreting “body language” as a fundamental and effective practice in 
the selection of a jury.147  
 
IV. Conclusion 
 The propriety of using social science in jury selection has generated much 
commentary and debate.  Underlying the debate are two competing interests in jury 
selection and service.  Parties have a traditional common law privilege to strike 
prospective jurors arbitrarily on subjective grounds, which enables scientific jury 
selection.  More recently, the Supreme Court recognized an important collective interest 
of citizens in jury service, including a specific right of citizens to be free from exclusion 
from jury service based upon their status as a member of certain protected social 
categories, which runs counter to the practice of excluding prospective jurors based upon 
their psychological traits.   
Reconciling the competing interests may be impossible in the abstract.  We use 
the novel example of juror extraversion to illuminate the ways in which the competing 
interests function and the problems with their application to specific cases.  Taken 
together, our analysis suggests that the common-law norms of adhering to tradition to 
facilitate predictions about the legal outcome of particular disputes and to constrain the 
influence of individual biases in judicial decision-making, coupled with the historical 
conceptualization of the peremptory challenges as an overtly arbitrary and capricious 
exercise, are the instrumental considerations in determining the propriety of exercising 
147 Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506, 512 (8th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). 
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peremptory challenges based upon personality traits like extraversion.  The Supreme 
Court’s rhetoric aside, the supposed social benefits from jury service to individuals or 
society have comparatively little explanatory power.  Consistent with this analysis, we 
conclude that, in theory and practice, the practice of striking jurors based upon estimates 
of their personality traits, such as extraversion, is entirely appropriate.   
